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BOOK REVIEW
BLENDING FIELDS: TORT LAW, PHILOSOPHY,
AND LEGAL THEORY
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW. Edited by David G. Owen.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. xvi, 497. $75.00.
Reviewed by Heidi Li Feldman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Anthologies are a tricky business. It takes editorial skill to strike the right
balance between variation in topic and continuity of theme. David Owen, the
editor of Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law, has executed this feat with
panache. The volume collects original papers from an impressive array of torts
scholars, ranging from Richard Posner and Jules Coleman to Jeremy Waldron
and John Finnis to Tony Honor6 and Izhak Englard. (It is a tribute to the
volume that my illustrative list could have been equally as long and included
equally important writers whose papers appear in Philosophical Foundations
of Tort Law.) The articles by torts scholars offer philosophical insight into tort
theory, tort goals, and tort doctrine. As a special bonus, Philosophical
Foundations of Tort Law concludes with an afterword by Bernard Williams,
a major philosopher and a leading ethicist with strong interests in law, politics,
and political theory.
Reviewing anthologies is also a tricky business and a laundry list of
reactions to each individual essay would be unfair to the authors and tedious
to readers of this review. Instead, I propose to concentrate on Williams's
contribution to the book. Although Williams's fine entry might require a bit
of introduction to those readers who approach Philosophical Foundations of
Tort Law from the legal side, his piece raises a number of issues particularly
pressing to those interested in the relationships between law, philosophy, and
legal scholarship.
II. THE PUZZLE OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY
How should we connect related but discrete fields fruitfully without
Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1986,
Brown University; J.D. 1990, Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1993, University of Michigan.
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collapsing them into one another, thereby sacrificing each discipline's
distinctive strengths? This is the classic puzzle for interdisciplinary scholar-
ship: How to be genuinely interdisciplinary?
According to David Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law
"cannot make claim to interdisciplinary status in any full sense, for each essay
but one is written by a lawyer" and "each is written from a tort law point of
view, from the perspective of what philosophy can do for law, of how the law
can benefit from borrowing the type of reflective thought that 'belongs' to
philosophy" (p.25). Regardless of the editor's disclaimers, each of the essays
in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law must face the classic interdisciplin-
ary puzzle, at least in their execution, if not explicitly. Bernard Williams's
contribution addresses this conundrum directly.
In What Has Philosophy to Learn from Tort Law?, Williams inverts a
traditional jurisprudential inquiry. Rather than considering what law can learn
from philosophy, Williams investigates how law and legal practices might aid
modem philosophy's quest to understand and refine concepts central to our
ordinary ethical and political practices. Williams's central thesis, which he
calls "the Picture" (p.488) is as follows: Legal "concepts or distinctions that
have been variously applied, modified, and reinterpreted within a legal
tradition over a period of time" are telling as a "sound and reliable way of
thinking about the relevant areas of experience" because the "legal context is
one in which a lot turns on the outcome, and hence on the arguments that lead
to or legitimate legal outcomes" (p.488). In other words, common-law
reasoning adjudicates disputes via concepts and distinctions (e.g., liability,
causation) rooted in ordinary experience (e.g., fault, responsibility) but
embedded in a body of legal precedent (e.g., the common law of torts) that
continuously and self-consciously refines and reworks these concepts and
distinctions in order to better resolve current disputes. The pressure exerted
by this process on the development of these concepts and distinctions reveals
information about them that is relevant to their non-legal counterparts, but
which would not emerge during the course of ordinary usage because ordinary
usage neither demands nor involves the same sort of intense attention required
by common-law development.
I find Williams's hypothesis plausible and intriguing. He defends it against
two objections that center on whether legal concepts and distinctions relate to
nonlegal ones in the way that Williams's "Picture" requires (p.488). A large
part of the modem philosophical enterprise investigates the nature of ordinary
concepts-discovering anomalies and, sometimes, fashioning remedies. If an
understanding of the law is to bear on this enterprise, there must be a
meaningful, well-understood relationship between distinctively legal concepts
and the nonlegal concepts philosophy examines. As Williams notes, this
relationship can be questioned from two directions.
The first objection concedes that legal concepts and distinctions are
"recognizable to common sense" but denies that the legal process puts them
[Vol. 49:167
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under genuine pressure (p.489). On this view, the concepts and distinctions
that drive legal argument are neither commonsensical nor distinctively legal;
instead, they derive from other domains. For example, whether or not lawyers
and judges realize it, economic concepts and principles govern common-law
development. Therefore, philosophers cannot examine the legal concepts in
which lawyers and judges cast their arguments in order to learn about related
ordinary concepts, because the legal concepts do no real work and therefore
come under no real pressure. Williams effectively counters this objection. He
observes that legal concepts "must have some force even to serve as
rationalizations" (p.489), perhaps even as much force as Williams's original
thesis posits.
The arguments that do the work at the manifest level must be the
familiar ones. The theory [i.e. law and economics] regards them as
rationalizations, but they must nevertheless do some work, since
some process is actually going on at the manifest level, and that
process must have some of the characteristics (of claims being argued
against counter-claims and so on) that were identified [in Williams's
original thesis] (p.489).
Philosophers will recognize the pedigree of this sort of rejoinder. Williams
responds, in the spirit of J.L. Mackie, that whatever "really" drives the
development of legal concepts, legal practitioners use these concepts to
conduct their business, and they could not do this if the legal concepts had no
force in their own right.1 Williams proceeds to note that even if theories such
as law and economics correctly identify a "porosity" (p.490) that makes legal
concepts responsive to the latent theory, this simply provides further informa-
tion about the nonlegal concepts related to the legal ones, raising the question
of-and perhaps the beginning of an answer to-whether the non-legal
concepts are similarly porous.
The second objection concedes that common-law adjudication exerts
genuine pressure on legal concepts and distinctions, but denies that common-
law concepts and distinctions relate to nonlegal ones. Williams finds this line
of objection simply implausible on its surface (p.490). I agree. For example,
tort concepts of liability and causation are clearly kin to their everyday
counterparts.2 While there are subtle and important questions concerning the
1. The ethicist J.L. Mackie argued that ethical values are not actual properties of the world.
J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 15 (1977). According to Mackie it is
wrong to speak as if ethical values are indeed such properties. Id. at 35. But Mackie did not think
this ontological claim should cause us to change our moral discourse or suspend our ethical
judgment. In denying a certain ontological status to moral values, Mackie did not deny that ethics
and morality do and should inform human action. Indeed, Mackie urged that we continue to
develop ethical standards and use moral judgment to guide our behavior. Id. at 106, 123-124.
2. See Heidi Li Feldman, Objectivity in LegalJudgment, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1187, 1210-11
1997]
3
Feldman: Blending Fields: Tort Law, Philosophy, and Legal Theory
Published by Scholar Commons, 1997
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
degree and kind of autonomy legal concepts possess, many legal concepts are
certainly not far removed or insulated technical ones. Indeed, it is hard to see
how tort concepts in particular could be so insulated without becoming
inaccessible to the lay jurors who must apply them to decide specific tort
actions.
I also agree with Williams when he pinpoints a difference in the use of
everyday concepts and their legal counterparts. Williams correctly notes that
the law demands closure and a final resolution of a case. Finality can require
a conclusion about the nature of a legal concept where the contours of the
ordinary counterpart can be left fuzzy because ordinary usage of a concept
does not emulate the call for the finality in legal adjudication (p.490). This
need for closure can also distort legal use of concepts with counterparts in
domains other than the ordinary, such as science. For example, tort law's
treatment of causation-a concept with both an ordinary meaning and a
scientific one-forces certain issues which could and would be left open by
science.3 However, so long as we understand why the law operates as it does,
legal applications of concepts with ordinary or scientific counterparts will be
instructive, even when the legal application seems forced from the perspective
of ordinary or scientific use. The caveat of understanding law on its own terms
is crucial, as Williams realizes when he writes:
If philosophy can be instructed by the law in the terms offered by
[Williams's thesis] ... it will need an understanding of what the
forces are that operate on the law and are expressed in it ....
Philosophy, then, will not only have to attend to the principles and
goals of tort law; it will also have to understand at a theoretical level
why it has those principles and goals (p.492).
Williams is right. He does, though, overlook the distinctive place of legal
scholarship and law itself in achieving the appropriate theoretical understand-
ing of law's principles and goals. Williams does not affirmatively deny
potential theoretical contributions from law and legal scholarship. Indeed, he
does not even mention legal scholarship-a telling omission. Williams writes
as if it is politics and philosophy, particularly political philosophy, that will
supply a substantial measure of theoretical understanding of tort law's
animating ideals and purposes:
(1994) (noting the ties between the legal concept of negligence and the popular, moral concept
of negligence).
3. See Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass ExposureLitigation, 74 Tex. L.
Rev. 1, 41-43 (1995) (arguing that the legal system's demand for prompt and just dispute
resolution gives rise to a different approach to understanding causation than the scientific one).
[Vol. 49:167
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[I]t is an aspiration of a liberal society that the operations of power
should be so far as possible transparent, in at least the modest sense
that their supposed legitimation should not rest on systematic
misunderstanding.
This modest requirement does not imply that every political
practice must be legitimated in terms of some theory .... But in a
state governed by law the operations of the law represent the most
direct application of power to the individual, and granted further the
highly contested justifications of these operations in modern liberal
societies, it is in fact the case that in such societies the demands of
transparency are unlikely to be met without the resources of a
theoretical account. Some of that account, though political, will
undoubtedly overlap with the philosophical contribution and
constitute part of a political philosophy.
.. . [O]n the account I am suggesting, philosophy tries to learn
from the operations of the law, in conjunction with a theory of what
the law is up to-a theory partly provided by philosophy itself
(pp.492-93).
As always, Williams is subtle. He is careful to avoid falling back onto a top-
down approach, according to which we should ask what philosophy can teach
law. Nevertheless, Williams does privilege philosophy's position in the
theoretical domain.
While there is a history of fractious controversy over law's autonomy and
the distinctiveness of legal scholarship,' most lawyers do not regard them-
selves as politicians and most legal scholars do not regard themselves as
political philosophers. I think-and I believe Williams would concur-that
these self-images are correct. To borrow from Williams's discussions about
manifest legal argument and what might lie under its surface, one must
acknowledge the self-images and account for them even if one thinks lawyers
and legal scholars are self-deceived about their respective enterprises. It is
beyond the scope of this review for me to air the debate about the relationship
between law and politics or between legal scholarship and political philosophy.
I do think lawyers' and legal scholars' self-understandings create a presump-
tion of meaningful distinctions among their enterprises, politics, and
philosophy.
Even if we grant that law and legal scholarship maintain some notable
degree of autonomy from politics and political philosophy, the question still
remains: how might law and legal scholarship contribute uniquely to a
4. See Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 1835 (1988) (assessing the relationship between philosophy and standard legal scholarship).
1997]
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philosophically useful understanding of law's principles and goals? In other
words, how do law and legal study provide theoretical knowledge that helps
us understand the information provided by the common law about concepts
under pressure? To answer these questions, I examine a central case in tort
law to illustrate how legal scholarship can contribute to philosophical
understanding of central concepts in tort law.
III. PALSGRAF V. LONG ISLAND RAILROA
Every first-year American law student studies Palsgraf. Legal scholars
have written about it extensively.' And, the case centers on two major
concepts in tort law-duty of care and proximate cause-both of which fit
Williams's picture of legal concepts with nonlegal counterparts. By looking
closely at Palsgraf, we can test Williams's hypothesis about whether and how
common law can edify philosophical understanding of nonlegal concepts with
legal counterparts.
A brief review of PaIsgraf s central legal concepts helps to understand the
remarkable features of the appellate opinions in the case. Traditionally, the
general duty of care constitutes the liability standard in a tort's negligence
regime.7 This duty imposes an obligation on each of us to act as would a
reasonable person of prudence with due regard for his neighbors' safety.' We
owe this duty generally, to society at large.9 If we breach this duty, then we
are at fault and may owe damages to those injured because of our breach.
However, this may not be true in every instance. Even if we have breached
the general duty of care, thereby causing injury to another, our victim may not
be able to recover damages from us. To recover the victim must establish not
only that our careless conduct in fact caused him injury (an empirical
question), but he must also prove that our conduct proximately caused his
harm. 0 To demonstrate proximate causation, a plaintiff must show a
sufficiently tight connection between the defendant's negligent behavior and
5. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
6. See Richard A. Epstein, Two Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 73 GEO. L.J. 1377
(1985); Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 1401 (1961); Leon
Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MIcH. L. REV. 543 (1962); Leon
Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 789 (1930); William L. Prosser, Palsgraf
Revisited, 52 MICH. L. Rv. 1 (1953).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965).
8. See id. § 283; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 32, at 174 (5th ed. 1984).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 cmt. b (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, §
30.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1965).
[Vol. 49:167
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the plaintiff's resulting injury." At the doctrinal level, courts have long
wrestled with defining what counts as a sufficiently tight connection. At the
trial level, the issue of proximate causation tends to be less problematic,
because in the majority of tort cases the causal connection between the
defendant's carelessness and the plaintiff's injury is rather obvious. For
example, if I run you down while I am rollerblading, thereby causing you to
break your wrist, there is little question that my behavior is closely and
causally connected with your injury, regardless of the doctrinal measure of
proximate causation.
In other cases, however, an attenuated set of events may result in a
plaintiff's injury. In these cases, where intuition founders, the fact finder needs
to rely more heavily on doctrinal structure to determine proximate causation.
Historically, two approaches have tempted courts.12 The first approach
requires the fact finder to decide whether the connection between the
defendant's careless conduct and the plaintiff's injury is direct. If it is, then the
plaintiff recovers.
The second approach asks the fact finder to determine whether the injury
suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable result of the defendant's careless-
ness. The difference between these approaches often vanishes in the face of
specific factual situations because of the high correlation between directness
and foreseeability. However, in some cases the two tests yield different
results, 3 and officially the majority of American courts adopt the directness
approach. 14
Regardless of the doctrinal approach to proximate causation, tort law
assigns the fact finder the job of assessing this issue. In other words, it is
usually the jury that decides whether the causal connection between the
defendant's careless act and the plaintiff's injury was sufficiently proximate to
warrant awarding damages to the plaintiff. Likewise, tort law reserves for the
jury the issue of breach of the general duty of care. Thus, the jury decides the
question of whether the defendant's conduct was in fact unreasonably careless.
11. Id. § 431 cmt. a.
12. See KEETON ET. AL., supra note 8, § 42 (describing and comparing the "directness" and
"foreseeability" approaches to proximate causation).
13. The most famous example is In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., 3 K.B. 560 (1921),
an English case that lays down the directness approach. In that case, the defendant's employees
carelessly caused a plank to fall into the ship's hold causing a spark that ignited a fire that
consumed the ship. The court ruled that while fire might not have been the foreseeable result of
carelessness in handling the plank, the fire was the direct, and therefore proximate, result of the
plank striking the ship.
14. See In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 723-25 (2d Cir. 1964). Judge Friendly
wrote for the court: "The weight of authority in this country rejects the limitation of damages
to consequences foreseeable at the time of the negligent conduct when the consequences are
'direct,' and the damage, although other and greater than expectable, is of the same general sort
that was risked." Id. at 724.
1997]
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In contrast, torts treats the task of defining the standard of care itself as a
matter of law, and therefore as a question for the judge.
Palsgraf is fascinating because it problematizes the preceding account of
the relationship between careless conduct and proximate causation and the
respective roles of the judge and the jury. In a famous opinion for the highest
court of New York, Chief Justice Cardozo sought to recast the way courts
approach the duty of care, thereby shifting power from the jury to the judge.
Writing for a four to three majority, Chief Justice Cardozo characterized
the underlying facts of Palsgraf as follows:
Plaintiff was standing on a platform of defendant's railroad after
buying a ticket to go to Rockaway Beach. A train stopped at the
station, bound for another place. Two men ran forward to catch it.
One of the men reached the platform of the car without mishap,
though the train was already moving. The other man, carrying a
package, jumped aboard the car, but seemed unsteady as if about to
fall. A guard on the car, who had held the door open, reached
forward to help him in, and another guard on the platform pushed
him from behind. In this act, the package was dislodged, and fell
upon the rails. It was a package of small size, about fifteen inches
long, and was covered by a newspaper. In fact it contained fire-
works, but there was nothing in its appearance to give notice of its
contents. The fireworks when they fell exploded. The shock of the
explosion threw down some scales at the other end of the platform
many feet away. The scales struck the plaintiff, causing injuries for
which she sues.15
Cardozo's account masterfully sets up his fundamental claim: The connection
between the railroad guards' act and Palsgraf's injury is too attenuated to
support liability for the railroad. At the outset Cardozo mentions the plaintiff
but not until many words, clauses, and sentences later does he refer to her
again. Cardozo does not mention that it was summertime and therefore likely
that passengers on the platform were traveling out of Manhattan to the beach
for recreation, including playing with fireworks. Both by his prose and by his
selection of facts, Cardozo makes the guards' carelessness seem quite remote
from what befell Palsgraf.
Such a factual account would lead the trained tort lawyer to expect an
appellate opinion ruling on the issue of proximate cause, eventually concluding
that the plaintiff could not carry her burden of proof on this issue. But the
originality of Cardozo's famous decision lies in the unexpected grounds on
which he relies to overturn the original jury verdict in favor of Palsgraf.
15. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
[Vol. 49:167
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Instead of arguing that the jury decided incorrectly that the guard proximately
caused Palsgraf's injuries, Cardozo argued, "The conduct of the defendant's
guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong
in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively to her it was not
negligence at all. "16
This is an odd way to discuss negligence. As I noted earlier, traditional
tort doctrine understands negligence as a breach of a general duty of care, one
owed to society at large. As Bernard Williams might describe it, the traditional
tort concept, like its ordinary counterpart, is not victim-specific. One can be
generally careless, and-with luck-inflict no injury at all. Even so, one would
still have been careless.
Justice Andrew's dissent in Palsgraf pinpointed these issues:
[M]ay [the plaintiff] recover the damages she has suffered. . . ? The
result we shall reach depends upon our theory as to the nature of
negligence. Is it a relative concept-the breach of some duty owing
to a particular person or to particular persons? Or, where there is an
act which unreasonably threatens the safety of others, is the doer
liable for all its proximate consequences, even where they result in
injury to one who would generally be thought to be outside the
radius of danger? . . .If. . .we adopt the second hypothesis, we
have to inquire only as to the relation between cause and effect. We
deal in terms of proximate cause, not of negligence.17
Andrews then emphasized the traditional approach to breach and proximate
causation:
Where there is the unreasonable act, and some right that may be
affected there is negligence whether damage does or does not
result. . . .The act itself is wrongful. It is a wrong not only to those
who happen to be within the radius of danger, but to all who might
have been there-a wrong to the public at large. Such is the language
of the street.18
After linking legal and nonlegal understandings of negligence, Andrews turns
to proximate causation. Yet he does not exhaustively delimit this concept.
These two words [proximate cause] have never been given an
inclusive definition. What is cause in a legal sense, still more what
16. Id. (emphasis added).
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is a proximate cause, depend in each case upon many considerations,
as does the existence of negligence itself. Any philosophical doctrine
of causation does not help us....
.. What we do mean by the word "proximate" is that, because
of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law
arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.
This is not logic. It is practical politics.' 9
Although Andrews rejected even the attempt to define proximate cause
comprehensively, he did suggest how a trial court should approach the issue.
The court must ask itself whether there was a natural and continuous
sequence between cause and effect. Was the one a substantial factor
in producing the other? Was there a direct connection between them,
without too many intervening causes? Is the effect of cause on result
not too attenuated? Is the cause likely, in the usual judgment of
mankind, to produce the result? Or, by the exercise of prudent
foresight, could the result be foreseen? Is the result too remote from
the cause, and here we consider remoteness in time and space.2'
Then, applying this method, Andrews concluded that a fact finder could
reasonably decide that the defendant had proximately caused Palsgraf's
injuries.
This last suggestion is the factor which must determine the case
before us. The act upon which defendant's liability rests is knocking
an apparently harmless package onto the platform. The act was
negligent. For its proximate consequences the defendant is lia-
ble. . . . Mrs. Palsgraf was standing some distance away. How far
cannot be told from the record-apparently 25 or 30 feet, perhaps
less. Except for the explosion, she would not have been injured. We
are told by the appellant [the railroad guard] in his brief, "It cannot
be denied that the explosion was the direct cause of the plaintiffs
injuries." So it was a substantial factor in producing the result-there
was here a natural and continuous sequence-direct connection. The
only intervening cause was that, instead of blowing her to the
ground, the concussion smashed the weighing machine which in turn
fell upon her. There was no remoteness in time, little in space. And
surely, given such an explosion as here, it needed no great foresight
19. Id. at 103.
20. Id. at 104.
[Vol. 49:167
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to predict that the natural result would be to injure one on the
platform at no greater distance from its scene than was the plain-
tiff....
Under these circumstances I cannot say as a matter of law that
the plaintiff's injuries were not the proximate result of the negli-
gence.2
In many respects, Palsgraf and its subsequent history confirm Williams's
hypothesis about how common law can illuminate concepts with legal and
nonlegal versions. But Palsgraf also demonstrates that Williams overlooks
some of what philosophers must understand in order to plumb common law for
insight.
In Palsgraf a narrowly divided appellate court splits, with the minority
adopting the traditional common law approach to duty of care and proximate
cause and the majority embracing a novel path. This is an unusual result. It
requires explanation, particularly if philosophers are to learn from the case.
Why did the majority not side with the "language of the street" and the
precedent of tort doctrine, granting the defendant's breach of its duty of care
and deciding the case on the issue of proximate causation? Cardozo's opinion
skirts the edges of common law propriety and strains the relationship between
legal and nonlegal understandings of carelessness. Understanding why Cardozo
would take these steps calls for a deeper appreciation of both legal practice
and tort theory. But whereas Williams emphasizes the need to look to politics
and political philosophy to gain such an appreciation, I maintain we need to
look as much to legal theory and the law itself. This calls for distinctively
legal scholarship, performed by those trained in and familiar with particular
substantive legal fields and the procedural mechanisms of the common law.
A nonlawyer reading Palsgraf might appreciate that Cardozo advances a
substantive change in the concept of the duty of care, particularly because
Andrews draws attention to this. What the nonlawyer probably will not
appreciate is the procedural impact of this change. Recall that Cardozo sought
to replace the concept of general carelessness with a victim-specific concept
of carelessness. This shift would have expanded the power of the trial judge
at the expense of the purview of the jury. Using Cardozo's approach, the
judge would determine whether the defendant's putative carelessness was
sufficiently directed toward the plaintiff for the plaintiff to bring a cause of
action. Only if the judge decided this question in the plaintiff's favor could she
reach a jury on the issue of negligence itself. Following his own approach,
Cardozo overturned the original jury verdict in Palsgraf on the ground that the
guards' carelessness was not directed toward Palsgraf. Under Cardozo's rule,
many cases that would otherwise come before a jury would be dismissed by
21. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 105.
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the judge.
Cardozo was certainly aware of this. He was also aware of the liability
limiting effects of such a shift in power from jury to judge. The victim-specific
concept of negligence circumscribes the scope of injured people with standing
to bring suit. Furthermore, by introducing another preliminary issue for the
judge, Cardozo's reconceptualization would deter lawsuits. Because tort
plaintiffs are usually judged more harshly by judges than by juries, the court's
holding would discourage personal injury lawyers-who work on a contin-
gency fee basis-from taking cases on behalf of injured plaintiffs who were not
fairly obviously within the direction of the defendant's negligence. Even if
lawyers took such cases, they would be more likely to settle them for lower
amounts than if they thought these plaintiffs would be able to reach a jury.
Even if we favor limiting tort liability, this goal might not best be
accomplished via Cardozo's transformation of the concept of the general duty
of care. Moving from the procedural level to the theoretical one, we must
investigate the impact of a victim-specific duty of care on tort law's traditional
goals: compensation for those injured by unduly risky conduct; deterrence of
such conduct; and corrective justice, whereby the tortfeasor makes whole the
injured plaintiff. By limiting liability, Cardozo's approach would affect all
three. Clearly, limiting the standing of those injured through others'
carelessness decreases instances of compensation and corrective justice. And
while part of the effect on deterrence is obvious, part of the potential effect is
more subtle. Plainly, any liability limiting measure makes activity that puts
others at risk less costly. Moreover, a victim-specific duty of care would have
a quite complex impact on deterrence.
Carelessness has a distinctive feature. When people act carelessly, they
act unthinkingly. Often then, precisely what a tort defendant has failed to do
was to think about who might be injured by the defendant's own actions and
in what way. Likewise, a victim is unlikely to have been able to warn the
injurer that the defendant's conduct would injure the victim. Generally, an
accident brought about by carelessness is even more unexpected from the
victim's point of view than from the injurer's. How then to discourage people
from unthinkingly acting in ways that are likely to injure others?
The traditional duty of care answers this riddle. This duty obligates each
of us to act generally with care. To fulfill the duty one need not-indeed
should not-attempt to identify particular persons whom one should treat with
special care. Instead, one ought to exercise broad caution. This may lead one
to contemplate particular persons who might be affected by one's activity, but
it may not. For example, careful driving involves maintaining appropriate
speed, signaling, checking one's mirrors, and so forth. When a driver takes
these measures, the driver is not usually contemplating the particular people
put at risk. Yet these measures protect any number of people, including those
who might be injured through an unexpected series of events should the driver
omit precautions and cause an accident.
[Vol. 49:167
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Generally, courts have not adopted the victim-specific concept of
negligence Cardozo advanced in Palsgraf (although in some jurisdictions
Cardozo's ideas about foreseeability have influenced courts' interpretations of
proximate causation).2 With a more theoretically sophisticated understanding
of the relationship between the duty of care and the deterrence objective of tort
law, this outcome makes sense. I submit that, compared to nonlawyers
(including philosophers and politicians who are not trained in law), lawyers
and legal scholars might more readily recognize the significance of the
connection between keeping the duty of care general and discouraging
unthinking carelessness, just as they would more likely recognize the
procedural ramifications of Cardozo's proposed change. Thus, those with legal
training and experience can perceive the radical dimension of Palsgraf, and
therefore understand its relatively limited precedential impact. Yet at the same
time, legal thinkers can quickly appreciate that the opposition between Card-
ozo's radicalism and Andrews's traditionalism makes Palsgraf a focal point for
study and debate, despite the case's relatively limited effect on subsequent tort
law development.
Palsgraf, political philosophy, and legal scholarship have a more general
relationship too. We should not expect political philosophy to offer much
direct theoretical insight into the case law and central concepts of any
particular legal field. Political philosophy has traditionally provided relatively
grand theory, at least compared to the sort of particularity found in specific
cases focused on applications of distinctive concepts in a given area of law. If
we want to bring political philosophy to bear on common law, we must
mediate between these two styles. Legal scholarship of all sorts can, and often
does, provide the theoretical insight Williams considers necessary for
philosophy to learn from law. It is a further open question whether this
educational project would benefit more from bringing political philosophy to
bear on the knowledge provided by legal scholarship or the philosophical
knowledge gained by a theoretically informed examination of the common law.
IV. THICK CONCEPTS AND THE MUTUAL EDUCATION OF LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY
Williams writes: "[It would be very surprising if philosophy could learn
only from the less controversial parts of legal argument and doctrine, and it
is itself significant that some concepts constantly cause trouble in the law and
provide a focus for reinterpretation and controversy" (p.494). Again, Williams
is right. Yet again, he omits an important and intriguing point related to his
22. Thejudicial reception of Palsgrafis reflected in American legal education. For example,
Richard Epstein, a leading torts scholar, includes Palsgraf in the proximate cause section of his
casebook. RICHARD EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 491, 512 (6th ed. 1995).
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claim: In tort law, and perhaps the common law more generally, it is
precisely the same concepts that are at once controversial and noncontrover-
sial. Concepts like negligence, strict liability, cause-in-fact, and proximate
cause are the workhorses of tort law, cleanly resolving many disputes over
personal injuries. But these same concepts are also the ones at the center of
some of the fiercest debates in appellate case law. Interestingly, these central
legal concepts are usually "thick concepts," a term coined by Williams himself
in his superb book Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy;2' and philosophy does
shed light on why thick legal concepts tend to function very smoothly in some
instances and quite poorly in others. At the same time, through careful study
of case law, philosophy can learn more about the nature and workings of thick
concepts.
Williams characterizes thick concepts as "world-guided" and "action-
guiding" in virtue of the specific way in which it is world-guided.24 In other
words, thick concepts apply only under certain factual circumstances. By
virtue of their applicability, these concepts evaluate those circumstances. This
evaluative component gives thick concepts force to guide our feelings, beliefs,
and actions. A good example of a thick concept is rude. While there may be
gray areas, this concept describes a limited range of behavior and simulta-
neously evaluates that behavior negatively. Actually, this depiction of the
evaluative force of rude is too rough. Behavior that is correctly deemed rude
is not just generically bad: its negative quality is more nuanced. Rudeness is
not wicked or unjust, two other possible ways in which behavior, broadly
speaking, can be bad. And our responses to rudeness-emotional or behavior-
al-reflect the nuanced and distinctive way in which rudeness, again speaking
broadly, is bad. The subtleties in both the descriptive and the evaluative
dimensions of a thick concept, make it especially precise in guiding our
feelings, beliefs, and behavior: We do not jail rude people (at least not for
their rudeness), and we do not feel about them like those whose behavior is
more aptly described by different thick concepts-say, the dull or the prissy.
A thick concept is an instrument for sensitively navigating between the way the
world is, our responses to it, and the judgments we make.
By now we can easily see why thick concepts pepper common law.
Common-law reasoning turns on the considered application of thick concepts.
For example, courts assess whether certain events constitute a breach of the
duty of care or proximate causation and, depending upon the assessment, make
23. BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHics AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985). Philosophers
have studied thick concepts throughout the second half of the twentieth century. See Feldman,
supra note 2, at 1191-94. I have written about thick concepts more extensively elsewhere,
actually counting them a subset of a broader category of concepts that seem to blend evaluation
and description. See id. at 1194-1212. For present purposes, however, we can do with a less
careful discussion of such concepts,just enough to understand why the law is replete with them.
24. WELLIAMS, supra note 23, at 140.
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certain judgments about liability. Just as thick social concepts-such as rude,
dull, or prissy-thick legal concepts elicit different evaluative responses and
therefore different feelings, beliefs, and actions. For example, compare
negligence with recklessness or intentional infliction of injury. These thick
legal concepts apply to different facts, sound distinct evaluative tones, and lead
to different consequences in legal liability.
So far, I have set to the side two important features of thick concepts.
First, thick concepts can be consciously engineered, either from the ground up
or by renovating a preexisting concept. Reflective users can self-consciously
attempt to modify a thick concept's descriptive or evaluative dimension, or
both. Sometimes users attempt such modification quite explicitly and openly
(consider the history of the concepts "gay" and "queer"). Other times they
pursue modification more indirectly, perhaps by simply acting as if other users
have already accepted the change and applying the concept accordingly
(consider the development of the concept "feminist"). These two strategies can
also be combined.
The second notable characteristic of thick concepts is that their applicabili-
ty is not always easy to decide. Sometimes one or both dimensions of a thick
concept will fit the circumstances. Gray cases provide especially good
opportunities for users seeking to modify a thick concept, particularly for a
user taking a somewhat indirect approach. Capitalizing on other users'
discomfort with the suitability of the thick concept under the circumstances,
someone seeking to re-engineer the concept can motivate others to accept the
revised version. Among highly reflective users of thick concepts, this dynamic
can become extremely complex. Such users may disagree about whether a
given thick concept, traditionally understood, applies readily. One user may
anticipate that another will claim grayness in order to appeal for modification.
Such a claim of grayness may be more or less disingenuous.
Common-law cases illustrate the fully panoply of how thick concepts
function and develop. Often, thick legal concepts operate smoothly, settling
issues and outcomes. In other cases, however, precisely the same concepts
become problematic. As Palsgraf demonstrates, judges may disagree over the
applicability or contours of the most basic thick legal concepts. The opinions
in Palsgraf indicate that judges appreciate the thickness of certain legal
concepts, acknowledging and exploiting this characteristic in their arguments.
Because thick concepts steer common-law reasoning, when judges disagree
over a given thick legal concept's applicability or shape, the practical stakes
can be high with both procedural and substantive consequences.
As a vehicle for exploring thick legal concepts and their use in appellate
opinions, Palsgraf can be read several ways. On first reading, the case is an
easy one. Taking the traditional view of the descriptive and evaluative
dimensions of breach and proximate cause, one can argue, as Judge Andrews
did, that these concepts apply to the facts of the case in a fairly, if not
perfectly straightforward way. Thus, these concepts should have clearly settled
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the issue of the railroad's liability for Mrs. Palsgraf's injuries. Although Judge
Andrews certainly would not have referred to proximate cause as a thick
concept, his discussion bespeaks his appreciation of the concept's dual
descriptive and evaluative character and its role in guiding decisions. He raises
the problem of the concept's reaches with a series of analogies: ripples in a
pond caused by a boy throwing a stone, a stream joined by tributaries until it
becomes a river, and a fire spreading from a spark to a haystack to a series of
buildings.' Andrews identifies both descriptive guideposts and evaluative
considerations that bear on how proximate cause applies to such situations.
Thinking more descriptively,
[t]he court must ask itself whether there was a natural and continuous
sequence between cause and effect. Was the one a substantial factor in
producing the other? Was there a direct connection between them, without
too many intervening causes? . . . [C]ould the result be foreseen? Is the
result too remote from the cause, and here we consider remoteness in
time and space.'
Of course even these seemingly descriptive criteria have strong evaluative
overtones. What we regard as natural, substantial, direct, foreseeable, and
remote is not independent of our values. Andrews recognizes that these
judgments require reference to the more obviously evaluative dimension of
proximate cause, a dimension comprised "of convenience, of public policy, of
a rough sense of justice."'27 Andrews does not suggest that a jury could not
have reasonably declined to regard the railroad guards' conduct as a proximate
cause dislodging the scales that struck Palsgraf; but he does conclude that a
jury could reasonably and appropriately apply the concept to that conduct and
the resulting injuries to the plaintiff, thereby finding the defendant liable. 28
A second reading also makes the case fairly easy, but in a different way
than Andrews' interpretation did. On this reading, the concept of proximate
cause definitely applies. The only difficulty lies in deciding which way it
applies, that is whether this concept definitively rules out or definitively rules
in the guards' conduct as the proximate cause of Palsgraf's injuries. One might
argue that given the law's accepted understanding of proximate cause,
Andrews was rather open-minded to suggest that reasonable fact finders could
reach opposite conclusions concerning whether the guards' conduct proximate-
ly caused Palsgraf's injuries. Depending upon how one perceives the
underlying facts of the case and the implications of holding the railroad liable,
25. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103-04.
26. Id. at 104.
27. Id. at 103.
28. Id. at 105.
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one could argue either that the guards' conduct definitely was or definitely was
not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs harm. Based on either of these
arguments, clearly the issue should have been taken from the jury and decided
by the trial judge.
On a third reading, Palsgraf is truly a hard case because the thick legal
concepts of breach and duty of care are not as clear as the traditional view
would have it. In my earlier review of breach of the duty of care, I character-
ized the general duty of care as unproblematically understood as an obligation
to society at large to act like a reasonable person of prudence with due regard
for a neighbors' safety.29 Accordingly, duty of care is apparently a thick
concept. Although Cardozo might agree with this, he would likely challenge
my view of the traditional meaning of duty of care by questioning whether I
had characterized the concept correctly. Cardozo depicts negligence as
relative, characterizing the duty of care as one owed to specific victims, rather
than to society as a whole. If there were precedent for Cardozo's depiction,
regarding him as a sincere challenger to my traditional view would make
sense. Palsgraf would then be a difficult case because it would demand
resolution of two rival lines of precedent about the concept of the duty of care.
This reading does not best capture Cardozo's treatment of duty of care.
A better reading accepts that Cardozo's depiction enjoyed little or no
precedential support and understands Cardozo's opinion as an effort to re-
engineer the duty of care, maintaining its thickness, but modifying both its
descriptive and evaluative dimensions. Cardozo combined both a direct and an
indirect strategy in this attempt. Early in his opinion, he writes as if the
concept of negligence is generally understood as he wishes to portray it: "The
conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the
package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away.
Relatively to her it was not negligence at all. "30 Cardozo's statement does not
suggest an unusual way to talk about negligence. However, after arguing at
length that rejecting the victim-specific version of the duty of care would
"involve us, and swiftly too, in a maze of contradictions," 31 Cardozo later
states a conclusion he apparently thinks he has been defending: "Negligence,
like risk, is thus a term of relation." 32 This sounds more like the voice of
someone who is explicitly urging a revision of the official understanding of the
concept. Cardozo's position rests in part on an unstated claim that negligence
is already treated as if it were officially understood this way. Thus, Cardozo
skillfully downplays the radical aspect of this revision. Cardozo is adroit. He
redesigns the duty of care with a nimble interweaving of direct and indirect
29. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
30. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
31. Id. at 100.
32. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
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strokes, illustrating just how effectively a sophisticated, reflective, practiced
user of thick legal concepts can attempt their modification.
Cardozo's sensitivity to the thickness of the concept of the duty of care
is evidenced by the way he addresses both its evaluative and descriptive
dimensions, as well as his keen awareness that the concept's application guides
outcomes. At first, his opinion concentrates on the type of wrongness
negligence involves, distinguishing its evaluative tone from others.33 Then,
Cardozo turns to the descriptive angle, supplying a series of factual hypo-
theticals designed to show the absurdity of a non-relative, general duty of care.
These hypotheticals range from a guard stumbling over newspapers that turn
out to be dynamite34 to someone who "jostles [his] neighbor in a crowd...
when the unintended contact casts a bomb upon the ground" thereby injuring
those "at the outer fringe."3"
It seems plausible that Cardozo's keen sense for how thick concepts
function helped him garner a one-vote majority opinion that rather radically
re-engineers the concept of the duty of care. Philosophy can learn about thick
concepts not only from Cardozo's opinion in PaIsgraf, but also from the
subsequent impact of his ideas. As I noted previously, Palsgraf did not
inaugurate a lasting change in tort law's treatment of the duty of care. While
Cardozo's efforts to shape that thick concept did not take, his ideas did
influence the doctrinal development of proximate cause, the thick legal concept
Andrews considered central to Palsgraf. Philosophy can learn from Andrews
as well. In his discussion of the guidelines for applying the concept of
proximate cause, Andrews lists various factors courts have thought pertinent
to assessing proximate cause-directness, remoteness, naturalness, public
policy, convenience, and politics. However, Andrews does not clarify the
relationships between these considerations. This sort of murkiness makes a
thick concept ripe for renovation. Restricting liability according to the
foreseeability of the class of potential victims that includes the plain-
tiff-essentially, Cardozo's idea-establishes clearer guidelines for assessing
proximate causation.
V. PHILOSOPHCAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW AND THE
INTERDISCIPLINARY PUZZLE
David Owen's Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law is an important
collection of essays that seeks to explore and understand the relationship
between tort law concepts and philosophy. Owen fulfills his objective of
"bring[ing] together the learning of these two separate disciplines" by inviting
33. Id. at 99.
34. Id. at 100.
35. Id. at 101.
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an important group of writers to share their thoughts on what philosophy can
learn from tort law (p.25). In addition, Owen includes Bernard Williams's
Afterword, which goes further by juxtaposing this inquiry. Williams reminds
the law of torts that it too can benefit from a much needed reevaluation of
those philosophic concepts which guide the field.
By examining individual common-law cases, as I did with Palsgraf, and
by comparing how thick legal concepts function in different cases, philoso-
phers can engage in the sort of learning from the ground up that Bernard
Williams proposes in What Has Philosophy to Learn from Tort Law? If the
thick legal concepts under study have nonlegal counterparts, this exercise
could provide precisely the sort of knowledge Williams envisions. Even if
thick legal concepts turn out to be rather technical, with no obvious nonlegal
counterparts, philosophy could benefit from a detailed analysis of how judges
and lawyers apply, deploy, manipulate, exploit, and engineer thick legal
concepts. Such an analysis could yield general insights into the workings of
thick concepts throughout the various domains in which they operate.
In additionto Williams's contribution, many of the essays in Philosophical
Foundations of Tort Law contribute to serious interdisciplinary study. I
particularly enjoyed Tort Law in the Aristotelian Tradition by James Gordley
and Risk, Harm, and Responsibility by Stephen Perry. I note these articles in
concluding this review because they both exemplify the sort of legal scholar-
ship that fills the vacuum overlooked by Williams in his account of the
relationship between philosophy and law-the sort of legal scholarship I
pursued on a smaller scale in the preceding sections of this review. Both
Gordley and Perry identify and address an issue with philosophical and legal
significance, drawing on legal and philosophical knowledge to explore some
of tort's broader principles and goals. This scholarship is distinctively legal,
yet at the same time deliberately and effectively engages philosophy.
Fortunately for those who value such genuinely interdisciplinary work, so do
many of the other pieces in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law.
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